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CASE NOTE
LABOR LAW: WHEN SHOULD THE NLRB WITHHOLD
JURISDICTION PENDING AN ARBITRATION
In the typical modern collective bargaining agreement, disputes
which arise between the parties during the term of the contract are
made subject to resolution through the grievance-arbitration provisions
of the agreement. However, the conduct underlying certain of these
disputes might also constitute unfair labor practices, which are within
the province of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). It is
necessary, therefore, to delineate those situations in which the NLRB
should refrain from issuing a complaint charging unfair labor practices, thereby permitting the grievance-arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement to be used to resolve the dispute, in
accord with the intent of the parties as expressed in the language of
their agreement.
Section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that
the power of the Board with respect to unfair labor practices "shall
not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that
has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise. . .. "'
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Board, for reasons of policy, has
seen fit in appropriate circumstances to withhold or limit the jurisdictionally permissible scope of its powers. It is the premise of this
paper that when the parties have agreed to pursue settlement of a dispute through the grievance-arbitration provisions of their collective
bargaining agreement, the Board should not issue a complaint until an
arbitration award has been made.
To establish that premise, it is first necessary to show the role of
the grievance-arbitration procedure in the collective bargaining system
and then to demonstrate the strong public policy in favor of labor arbitration. The Supreme Court, in the Steelworkers trilogy,2 described
its conception of collective bargaining. In United States Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., the Court observed: "A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial selfgovernment."' 3 Thus, the agreement becomes more than a mere contract; rather, it is a generalized code to cover the entire relationship
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §10(a), 61 Stat. 146
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §160(a) (1965).
2United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). As the
Board pointed out in Aerodex Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964), these cases are
inopposite as authority for the proposition that the Board should withhold
its own jurisdiction in favor of arbitration, but nonetheless these cases do
set forth the policy in favor of the arbitration of labor disputes.
3363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 50

between the parties, including the myriad of situations which no draftsman could anticipate. As the late Dean Shulman said, the written
collective bargaining document is:
a compilation of diverse provisions: some provide objective
criteria almost automatically applicable; some provide more or
less specific standards which require reason and judgment in
their application; and some do little more than leave problems
to future
consideration with an expression of hope and good
4
faith.
Thus the gaps which arise during the existence of the collective
bargaining agreement must be filled. It is the function of the grievancearbitration provisions to provide a procedure by which these disputes
can be settled without a strike or other industrial strife. The result of
a smoothly functioning arbitration procedure is that the area of agreement between the parties is continually expanded. In the Warrior &
Gulf Nav. Co. case, the Supreme Court concluded that:
...the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means of solving the unforseeable by
molding a system of private law for all the problems which may
arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties.
The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery
is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given
to the collective bargaining agreement.
Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all
of the questions on which the parties disagree must therefore
come within the scope of the grievance and arbitration provisions
of the collective agreement. The grievance procedure is, in other
words, a part of the continuous collective bargaining process.5
Thus to the same extent that there is a federal policy in favor of
the collective bargaining system, there is a public policy in favor of
the grievance-arbitration provisions which form an integral part of
that system. 6 This public policy in favor of the voluntary adjustment
of collective bargaining disputes through the use of grievance procedures is manifested in section 201(a) and (b) and section 203(d)
of the Act. 7 Section 203(d) provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation
of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. The Service is
directed to make its conciliation and mediation services available
4 Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv.
999, 1005 (1955).
5 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
6Id. at 578.

761 Stat. 152, 53 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§171, 173 (1965). See Brown, Collective

Bargaining in a Free Society, 51 L.R.R.M. 96 (1962).
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in the settlement of such grievance disputes only as a last resort
and in exceptional cases.
The National Labor Relations Board has endorsed this policy in
favor of arbitration in International Harvester Co.
If complete effectuation of the Federal policy [in favor of
arbitration] is to be achieved, we firmly believe that the Board,
vhich is entrusted with the administration of one of the many
facets of national labor policy, should give hospitable acceptance
to the arbitral process as "part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself," [citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)] and voluntarily
withhold its undoubted authority to adjudicate alleged unfair
labor practices charges involving the same subject matter. ....
.

A situation in which the Board will sometimes withhold its own
jurisdiction in favor of grievance-arbitration procedures is when an
arbitration award has already been made. In Spielberg Mfg. Co.,10
the Board set out the criteria by which it would review arbitration
awards to determine whether it would withhold its own jurisdiction:
The criteria are: 1) the arbitration proceedings must have been fair
and regular; 2) all the parties must have agreed to be bound to the
award; and 3) the decision of the arbitrator must not be clearly repugnant to the purposes of the Act.
The Board has indicated that in certain circumstances it would
withhold its own jurisdiction even when an arbitration award had not
been made. In the Adams Dairy case," the Board asserted jurisdiction
and distinguished the case at hand where none of the parties had moved
for arbitration even though the agreement provided for arbitration from
a situation where the Board would withhold its own jurisdiction because of a pending arbitration. The Board said that before it would
withhold its own jurisdiction: 1) the case must turn primarily on an
interpretation of a specific contractual provision; 2) the case must unquestionably be encompassed by the arbitration provisions of the contract; and 3) it must be reasonably probable that the eventual arbitration settlement would also put to rest the unfair labor practice controversy in a manner sufficient to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Member Brown, in his concurring opinion, more fully discussed
situations in which the Board should withhold its jurisdiction before
an arbitration award has been handed down. He concluded that "it is
inconsistent with the statutory policy favoring arbitration for the
Board to resolve disputes which, while cast as unfair labor practices,
snternational

Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962), enforced sub nont.

Ramsey v. N.L.R.B. 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir., 1964).
9 See id. and Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
10 Spielberg MfF. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).

"Cloverleaf Division of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1415-1416 (1964),
hereinafter called "Adams Dairy."
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essentially involve a dispute with respect to the interpretation or application of the collective-bargaining agreement." 12 In such a situation
Member Brown would withhold jurisdiction until there has been an
arbitration award, and then review the award according to the Spielberg
standard. Not only would he have the Board withhold jurisdiction in
a situation where the subject matter of the dispute involved the interpretation of a specific contractual provision, but he would also have
the Board withhold jurisdiction whenever the dispute would involve
a more general question as to the relation of the parties, as long as
the dispute involved a question of contract, past practice, or bargaining
history of the parties. 13 In light of the broad role which arbitration
is expected to play in our system of industrial government, it seems
that Member Brown's standard would more fully give Board support
to the arbitration process than does the standard of the Adams Dairy
majority opinion.
In Tex-Tan-Welhausen Co.,1 4 there were two grievances. The Valka
grievance was filed but it was never taken to arbitration after being
denied by the company at the first step of the several step grievance
procedure. The Board held that merely because the grievant had a right
to proceed to arbitration under the contract did not preclude him from
going to the Board in order to protect his rights. The Debault grievance
had gone to arbitration, though the award had not been handed down
at the time of the Trial Examiner's opinion. The Board held that it
would not withhold its own jurisdiction because the arbitration provisions of the agreement did not allow the arbitrator to make a de novo
decision on the subject matter of the dispute but rather limited the
arbitrator to reviewing the dispute to see if there was any evidence to
support the action taken by the company.
On the basis of these cases it is possible to establish a set of criteria
by which the Board should determine whether to withhold jurisdiction
in favor of the grievance-arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
1) The arbitration dispute must involve the same subject matter
as the unfair labor practice charge. 15
2) The arbitrator must have the authority under the agreement to
be able to decide the entire dispute de novo, including those aspects
which form the basis of the unfair labor practice charge.",
3) The dispute must be over the application or interpretation of an
12 Id. at 1423.
13 Ibid.

159 N.L.R.B. No. 141, 5 CCH 1966 LAB. REP. 520,612 (1966).
15 International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced sub nom.
Ramsey v. N.L.R.B., 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964); Cloverleaf Division of
Adams
Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964)
16 Tex-Tan Welhausen Co., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 141, 5 CCH 1966 LAB. L. REP.
520,612 (1966).

14
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existing collective-bargaining agreement, even if the dispute is cast in
unfair labor practice terminology.'7 The better view regarding this
criteria is the view espoused by Member Brown in Adams Dairy8
which includes subjects of past practice and bargaining history along
with the interpretation of specific contract provisions as part of what
constitutes the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.
4) All parties must have agreed to be bound to the decision of the
arbitrator.19 This means more than that the union and company had
agreed to be bound by any arbitration which might occur during the
course of the agreement. Rather, it would seem to require that, prior
to the issuance of the complaint, the parties had agreed to pursue
settlement of the particular dispute through arbitration.
There are several reasons for drawing the line where the parties
have agreed to be bound to the decision of an arbitrator. The underlying reason why the Board would ever withhold jurisdiction in favor
of arbitration is that the existence of both the Board and arbitration
is directed at the same end: that is, they both exist to prevent industrial strife. As long as arbitration is functioning so as to reach that
common end, there is no reason for the Board to intervene and duplicate the effort of the arbitrator.
Furthermore, when the Board does intervene after the parties had
agreed to arbitration, the arbitration process becomes stymied. As long
as the Board is exercising its own jurisdiction in the matter, the arbitrator loses his power to make a binding resolution of the dispute.
In Tex-Tan Welhausen Co.,20 for example, the Board issued a complaint after the parties agreed to arbitration but before the arbitration
took place. At the arbitration the counsel for the union reserved all
unfair labor practice questions for the Board, thereby preventing the
arbitrator from ever getting to the heart of the dispute which was the
same for both the Board action and the arbitration. In that case, the
issuance of the complaint by the Board effectively stopped the arbitration process. Though the Board was justified in exercising its jurisdiction in that case, the result directly contravened the public policy in
favor of arbitration.
In conclusion, when there is an arbitration clause in the contract
but when none of the parties have sought to make use of that provision to settle a dispute which also might be an unfair labor practice, the
Board should exercise its own jurisdiction in order to fulfill its statutory
mandate.
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER
1 Section 203(d)

of the Act; Cloverleaf Division of Adams Dairy Co., 147
N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
18 Supra, notes 11-15.
19 Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) ; Tex-Tan Welhausen Co., 159
N.L.R.B. No. 141, 5 CCH 1966 LAB. L. ReP. 520,612 (1966).
20159 N.L.R.B. No 141, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 520,612 (1966).

